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Compensation for Criminally
Inflicted Personal Injury
Robert Childres*
I. INTRODUCTIONt
I shall comment in some detail on two topical proposals for
compensation to victims of criminally inflicted personal injury'
and attempt to respond to the more salient criticisms of the idea
of compensation.
In the United Kingdom reformers demanded and eventually
obtained, from the government of then Prime Minister Douglas-
Home, a scheme of compensation for criminally inflicted personal
injury. New Zealand not untypically preceded England in the
statute books with a better program
When the proposal was aired in America, critics shifted the
question from personal injury criminally caused, to crime gen-
erally, and attacked the idea of compensating losses caused by
crime.4 No proponent nor statute advances anything so sweep-
ing. Expenses and lost income5 from disabling or fatal personal
*Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. His
previous articles on this question include The Victims, Harper's Magazine,
April, 1964, p. 159, and Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 444 (1964).
tAuthor's Note: Professor Edmond Caln, a brilliant colleague until his
tragic death, much clarified my thought on the question of compensation.
Professors Norman Dorsen and Charles Ares have contributed significantly
to my articles on the subject, and Mr. Robert Cordle very capably assisted in
the preparation of this paper.
1. Those of Senator Ralph W. Yarborough, S. 2155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) [hereinafter cited as "S. 21551"]; and the State of California; CAL. STAT.
ch. 1549 (1965). I have previously commented on the programs in England
and New Zealand in Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal
Injury, 89 N.Y.U.L. REv. 444 (1964).
2. Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, Canm No. 2323,
(1964) [hereinafter cited as BRITISH WE PAPER].
3. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, Act No. 134 of 1963 (N.Z.)
[hereinafter cited as "NEw ZEALAm Act No. 134"]; see Cameron, Compen-
sation for Victims of Crime: The New Zealand Ezperiment, 12 J. PuB. L. 367
(1963). My evaluation is argued in Childres, supra note 1, at 455-71.
4. Mueller, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence, 8 J. PUB. L.
218 (1959); Inbau, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence, 8 J. PUB.
L. 201 (1959).
5. Income should be read broadly to include lost services of, e.g., a wife,
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injury demark the outside limits of compensation proposals.'
All compensation proposals and programs exclude criminally
inflicted damage to property. They do so because: (1) most prop-
erty lost or damaged through crime is recovered; 7 (2) theft of or
damage to property never causes the disaster or social dislocation
which frequently accompanies serious injury to the person; (3) in
America, property is and may be expected to be more frequently
and thoroughly insured against losses caused by crime than is the
person; s (4) fraudulent claims of property loss would be virtually
impossible to prevent; and (5) a program of compensation for
criminally inflicted damage to property might be prohibitively
expensive.
The report of the Longford Committee in England supports
the exclusion of property from the English program in similar
terms:
The person whose goods are stolen often has them restored to him when
the thief is caught. The far greater frequency of offences against prop-
erty entitles the State to assume that owners will seek some protection
through insurance. The same assumption cannot easily be made in the
case of crimes of violence, since the victim's risk is more remote, and
the need for personal protection through private insurance is less
obvious in a civilised community. Furthermore, the hardship caused to
the victim of violent crime is far greater than, and in a different cate-
gory from, that which is suffered by the victim of theft or malicious
damage. The community should be concerned more with loss of life
and limb than with loss of property. A purely practical justification for
including crimes of violence and excluding property crimes is that the
latter give far greater opportunities for fraud.'0
II. THE YARBOROUGH PROPOSAL
The program embodied in Senator Ralph Yarborough's bill,"
but narrowly to restrict compensation to monetary loss, and that with a
maximum limitation. See generally Childres, supra note 1, at 462.
6. See BRTIsH WmT PAPER 221; NEw ZEwm Act No. 134 § 19; S.
2155 § 303. The only caveat necessary is the question of "compensating"
losses suffered through pain and suffering.
7. The F.B.I. estimates that 59% in value of all property stolen in 1964
was recovered. FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, UNIoFm CRIvm REPORTS
103 (1964).
8. Starrs, Private Insurance for Victims of Crime, 50 MINN. L. REV. 285
(1965).
9. It has been argued, I think seriously, that such a program would cost
$20,000,000,000 a year. See Mueller, supra note 4, at 230.
10. JUSTICE, BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COAnnISSION OF
JURISTS, COAPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRImES OF VIOLENCE 4 (1962) [here-
inafter cited as JUSTICE].
11. S. 2155.
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discussed by the Senator in this symposium, 2 is essentially the
New Zealand scheme adapted to the District of Columbia, the
federal territories, and the maritime jurisdiction. I shall comment
first on provisions of this bill which successfully counter objec-
tions to the idea of compensation, and then comment on those
provisions which seem to me wrong.
A. TE PROBLEM OF THE CULPABLE VICTIM
Professor Henry Weihofen of the University of New Mexico
School of Law has written the best statement of the problem of
the culpable victim:
[T]he victim all too often is not wholly innocent. He is likely to be the
"activating sufferer." A system of compensation would have to dis-
tinguish between truly innocent and not-so-innocent victims. It would
call for an integrated approach, a much more careful examination than
has yet been made of the interdependence of personality and culture.
If a compensation system were adopted before such examination, its
administration would almost certainly soon force such examination to
be made....
The various categories of cases we have mentioned, in which the
victim in one way or another precipitated the crime, add up to an ap-
preciable part of the total-perhaps one fourth of all violent crimes.
The premise from which we are inclined to start in our mental con-
struct of crime, that of an aggressive wrongdoer acting upon an innocent
and passive victim, is therefore untrue in about one case out of every
four.13
The victim who may be said to be partly responsible for his
injury presents a real problem for a program of compensation. In
discussing this problem one should first distinquish what we may
call family violence from other forms of criminally inflicted per-
sonal injury. The Senator excludes intra-family injury from his
program, thereby eliminating a large part of the culpable victim
problem. 14 However, I think the intra-family problem can be
solved without going so far.' 5
When considering the general question of the culpable victim,
one can produce visions of women yearning for rape, of society
12. Yarborough, S. 2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress- The Criminal In-
juries Compensation Act, 50 MruI. L. REv. 255 (1965).
13. Weihofen, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence, 8 J. PuB. L.
209, 217 (1959).
14. See S. 2155 § 304(c). The English also exclude intrafamily injury.
BRITISH WHrrE PAPR § 17. Interestingly, Senator Yarborough copies the
New Zealand provision prohibiting compensation for pain and suffering in
intrafamily cases, but New Zealand allows compensation for expenses and
lost income in such situations. N.w ZEALAND Act No. 134 § 18.
15. See text accompanying notes 31-32 infra.
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compensating mobsters, or of people claiming compensation after
losing a fist fight.' Some such people would undoubtedly receive
money, but this fact should deter our compensating the more
legitimate victim only if the problem cannot be kept within rea-
sonable bounds. The question is, therefore, how great is the
difficulty apt to be. Those who emphasize the magnitude of the
problem can produce arguments that the difficulty will be sub-
stantial only by lumping compensation for loss of property with
compensation for personal injury.'7 Leaving property aside, it
seems clear that not many people would risk broken legs or
smashed skulls for a few weeks off the job with pay. A compensa-
tion scheme with proper safeguards could prevent most of these
people from succeeding. But proper safeguards require careful
structuring of the statute to minimize the opportunity for fraudu-
lent claims.
The Yarborough proposal, following the New Zealand statute,
adopts the exclusionary standard - whether the victim directly
or indirectly contributed to his injury or death. 8 While this pro-
vision would be sound if linked with proper safeguards against
fraud, it would yet be subject to two limited criticisms. First,
consideration of the question is limited to whether to make an
award. Clearly, it should also be considered in determining how
much money should be awarded. There is no reason to tie the
commission's hands to an all or nothing question; it should have
authority to reduce, as well as to exclude awards. Secondly, this
standard is faulty in that it may be construed to make relevant
only those acts involved directly in the injury. A broader stand-
ard, similar to that adopted in England, seems preferable: "To
what extent was the victim responsible for his damage?"' 9 "Re-
sponsibility" is more easily read to include such things as partici-
pating in gang warfare than is "contribution."
B. REATION TO THE CRIINAL LAw
At least two attacks on compensation have been based on its
asserted interrelation with the criminal law. Professor Mueller
argues that ". . . the proposal is definitely objectionable as detri-
mental to effective criminal law enforcement .... When criminal
law enforcement caters too much to loss compensation and too
16. See Weihofen, supra note 13, at 210-12.
17. See Mueller, supra note 4, at 229.
18. Compare S. 2155 § 301(d), wit& NEw ZEALAm Act No. 134 § 17(g).
19. See BursnH WMrTE PAPER § 15.
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little to strategic prevention, lawlessness is bound to result."'
I do not believe that anyone else has ventured the argument
that compensation will increase crime. It should be kept in mind
in connection with all of Professor Mueller's arguments that "the
proposal" he refers to is not that actually advanced by proponents
of compensation but is the proposal to compensate losses from all
crime, which he develops as the straw man for his negative com-
ments. As to crime involving property, especially, as. he says,
"shady dealings,"21 his arguments seem to me to contain a certain
amount of good judgment.
But the argument that compensation will increase criminally
inflicted personal injury requires a premise that people will be
encouraged to risk or to cause death and disability because the
victim or his dependents may receive limited compensation for
monetary losses. Professor Mueller himself has so far refrained
from squarely stating that premise.2 I do not think there is any
reasonable basis for any such assertion, and in the absence of any
evidence to suyport it, the problem seems to disappear.
Professor Schafer suggests that reparation by the criminal
should replace punishment as the cornerstone of our correctional
procedure.s I am not clear whether he considers this proposal
relevant to the current controversy about compensating victims,
but he has asserted it in this context and the question must there-
fore be examined.
The idea of substituting reparation for punishment in the
criminal law is an intriguing one even for the noncriminologist.
But it is for the moment a notion to be much further examined
and elaborated by the criminologists before it can move into the
realm of current political questions. If ever the decision is made
to implement this theory, the overlap with compensation must be
vorked out with care, just as the overlap between compensation
and contemporary programs of restitution as a condition of pro-
bation 24 should be carefully worked out. For the foreseeable
future, however, Professor Schafer's argument exists in too theo-
retical a world to justify any such attention.
Neither the Mueller nor the Schafer argument is troublesome,
therefore, unless one posits a more basic involvement between
20. Mueller,* upra note, 4, at 231. See also Mueller, Should Society Pay
Crime's Victim .?, TnE RoTRL&N, Sept., 1965, pp. 23, 25.
21. Mueller, supra note 4, at 231..
22. Ibid.
23. Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime:-An Old Correctional Aim
Modernmized, 50 Mum. L. REv. 243 (1965).
24. Note, Restitution and the Criminal Law, 39 CoLum. L. REV. 1185
(1939). See generally RuBn, THS LAw or CJJA,[1 CORRECTION 198-202(1903).
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compensation and the criminal law than can be justified. The
Yarborough proposal makes clear the lack of connection with the
criminal law. The compensation machinery is entirely separate
from possible or actual criminal proceedings 5 An award estab-
lishes merely that a criminally inflicted personal injury has
occurred, not that some particular person committed a crime.
Criminal intent, vital to almost all crime, is properly declared
irrelevant to criminally inflicted personal injury.
C. ExcLusioN oF RELATrIVs OF THE "OmNDER"
A highly questionable provision in Senator Yarborough's bill
provides:
No compensation shall be awarded if the victim-(1) is a relative of the offender; or(2) was at the time of the personal injury or death of the victim living
with the offender as his wife or her husband or as a member of the
offender's household.28
The language is basically that of. the New Zealand statute,2 7
but with the very important difference that New Zealand allows
compensation for expenses and.lost. income, excluding only that
for pain and suffering. Senator Yarboroughi excludes compensa-
tion altogether from criminally inflicted personal injury withini
the family.
It is at least questionable whether such a sweeping exclusion
should become law before its. cdesirability or necessity is estab-
lished in practice. Two arguments are advanced in behalf of the
exclusion: (1) collision would be an especial problem within the
family; and (2) the offender mr.ight, otherwie benefit from his
criminal act.
Collusion is a general problem to b6. met' by denying compen-
sation to those -"responsible for"' their lossees.'and by strict pro-
cedures aimed at reducing the number of successful fraudulent
claims. But the risk of collusion within the fanmely seems no
greater than in cases *of claims based upon offenses committed
by a stranger with no witnesses, When we concentrate on the fact
that we are talking about personal injury;' the argument reduces
itself to the question-will the Cbmmission be able to distinguish
25. Though the Attorney General may request the Commission to suspend
its proceedings in light of a current or iminent trial. S. 2155 § 301(f).
26. S. 55 § 304(c).
27. Nuw ZEALAN Act No. 184 18(2).
28. See S. 2155 § 801(d); BmITsH WHITE PAPER § 15; NX.w ZEALAND Act
No. 134 § 17(3).
276 [V ol. 50:271
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between accidental or self inflicted injury, and injury caused by
the assualt of another? To this question, the family relationship
seems irrelevant. If not irrelevant, it would seem that collusion
would be less of a problem within the family; one would be more
likely to attempt to turn an accident into an assault by a stranger
than by one's spouse.
We are left with one argument for excluding relatives of the
offender from compensation: the offender must not be benefited.
This argument raises a technical question: can we design a pro-
gram which allows innocent relatives to receive compensation
while preventing offending ones from receiving any benefit? If in
the course of a quarrel between parents, for example, the father
attacks the mother and is killed, could the children receive com-
pensation without the mother being benefited personally? I
believe this to be the toughest question raised by the benefit ar-
gument, but I believe it can be answered affirmatively. Expendi-
tures on behalf of the children would have to be supervised very
carefully by the agency, but this is not an insurmountable diffi-
culty.
D. RIGHT oF APPEAL
The New Zealand statute restricts the right of appeal to ques-
tions of jurisdiction. 9 Senator Yarborough eliminates the right
altogether,30 thus following the English lead.31 I see no reason for
this departure from American administrative law practice.32
E. HEADS OF DmAGE AND LUwP Sum AwA-us
The remaining defects in the Yarborough scheme flow from
his conception of administrative agencies as judicial bodies-
little courts on their own.3 This seems the only explanation of
Senator Yarborough's provisions for heads of damage and form
of award.
1. Heads of Damage
One need not employ ancient notions to describe what should
29. See NEw ZEALAuD Act No. 184 § 16.
30. In the speech introducing his bill, Senator Yarborough said, "... there
will be no right of appeal." 111 CONG. Rrc. 13584 (daily ed. June 17, 1965),
and there is none. See S. 2155.
31. See BwTIsH WHITE PAPER § 12.
32. See generally Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 H.4nv. L. REv.
401, 769 (1958).
33. See generally Fu=r., TaE MoRA= OF LXw 170-84 (1964).
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be compensable. All proposals aim, with some maximum limita-
tion, at expenses and lost income." In addition however, Senator
Yarborough would allow compensation for "pain and suffering."85
Of course, pain and suffering cannot be compensated. When the
victim is dead, it is impossible even to salve his injured feelings
with a money payment (the notion refers to the victim's, not his
dependents', feelings). Pain and suffering makes little enough
sense in the common law; it makes none at all in state compen-
sation to victims of criminally inflicted personal injury.
2. The Lump Sum Award
The Yarborough bill provides for the payment to be deter-
mined at the time of the hearing, and for awards not exceeding
25,000 dollars, presumably to be paid at once 6 As with pain and
suffering, this makes sense only by analogy to the common law.
When disability is the subject, a projection of lost income can
be made on a reasonable basis, though the extent and duration
of disabilities are far from certain questions. But where death is
the subject, the lump sum does not bear any reasonable relation
to prospective loss. Compare the losses of the wife who remarries
one month after receiving an award for the death of her former
husband with that of the wife who never remarries. By predeter-
mining damages, one virtually insures that there will be no close
relation between the amount determined and losses thereafter
suffered. Compensation must be in the form of payments
periodically disbursed and under constant review if it is to bear
any close relation to damages suffered! 7
F. A DINTRASmVE PRoCEDui
Senator Yarborough's bill states little about administrative
procedure. Specifically, there are no provisions for reports by or
on behalf of the victims to the police, reports by the police or
prosecuting attorney to the agency, or medical reports to the
agency. These are unfortunate omissions.
34. See, e.g., JusTIcE 35-44; Childres, supra note 1, at 462-64. "Lost in-
come" is read to include lost services, when relevant, but is otherwise read
strictly as pecuniary loss.
35. S. 2155 3 03(d), following NEw Z&mmAm Act No. 184 1 19.
36. S. 2155 § 301(b). See also § 206 (2).
37. For more complete argument of this position see Childres, supra note
1, at 462-70.
[Vol. 50:9.71
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III. COMPENSATION IN CALIFORNIA
California is the only state yet to enact a compensation pro-
gram 88 Unfortunately, the quality of the reform fails to meet
the spirit. The program is the worst enacted anywhere, and is
also worse than any other proposal I have seen. I shall suggest
five defects which in sum render the program almost totally de-
fective, even harmful in the sense that it deceptively claims to
have met an important need.
A. ABSENCE or DEcIsIoNL CRITERIA
The California legislature directed its welfare department to
determine, inter alia, "criteria for [the] payment of . . " com-
pensation (unfortunately denominated "aid"), "if there is
need of such.... "89 The legislature added that the criteria "shall
be substantially the same as those provided for aid to families
with dependent children." 40 I am no expert in California welfare
law, and therefore venture no judgment on the analogy between
victims of criminally inflicted personal injury and "families with
dependent children." But anyone, including the California wel-
fare commission, is entitled to ask in what situations and for
what injuries people are entitled to receive "aid." The problem
is made more acute by the elimination of the property qualifica-
tion common to American welfare programs. "Need" is declared
a prerequisite, but how can it be a prerequisite if there is no
"property qualification"?
B. EXPENSES
An integral and often crucial provision of any compensation
program should be the immediate payment of extraordinary ex-
penses incurred because of the injury.4' Inexplicably, California
ignores, and appears to prohibit compensation for expenses.2
C. POLICE REPORT
There is no requirement that the victim report his injury to
the police within a definite period. Nor are the police or the prose-
88. CAL. STAT. ch. 1549 (1965).
Sq. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. See BarrsH Wm= PAME §§ 19-27; NEw ZEALa Act No. 134 § 19(c).
42. The appendage to the welfare scheme would seem to require this.
1965] 279
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cuting attorney required to submit an opinion as to the criminal-
ity of the conduct causing the injury. These two provisions are
of great importance to administrative efficiency and to the pre-
vention of fraudulent claims.4 Additionally, there is no period
beyond which all claims would be invalid.44 These omissions are
undesirable.
D. CowipmEsATioN AND THE CznmmA CouRTs
The California statute provides:
Upon conviction of a person of a crime of violence resulting in the
injury or death of another person, the court shall take into considera-
tion the defendant's economic condition, and unless it finds such action
will cause the family of the defendant to be dependent on public wel-
fare, shall, in addition to any other penalty, order the defendant to
pay a fine commensurate in amount with the offense committed.45
Among the many objections to this provision are:
(1) The court obtains this new power only if the subject
matter is a "crime of violence"; there is no definition of this
phrase.
(2) The "fine" should be commensurate with losses suffered
rather than with "the offense committed," if it is to be a legiti-
mate part of a compensation program.
(3) There is no reason for the judge to know, and every rea-
son for the compensation agency to know, the extent of the dam-
age the victim and his dependents have suffered and are likely
to suffer.
(4) Compensation and recovery from offenders are not crimi-
nal questions and should be determined by the compensation
agency or by the civil courts. 6
E. COMPENSATION AND THE PooR LAWS
The above defects flow in part from an inexplicable, all-encom-
passing flaw: the equation of compensation for criminally inflicted
personal injury with the poor laws, usually referred to in political
and polite circles as the welfare laws. It is important to emphasize
43. See BRITISH WHITE PAPrE § 14(b).
44. See Now ZEALAND Act No. 134 § 17(4); S. 2155 § 304(a).
45. CAL. STAT. ch. 1549 (1965).
46. Proceeding in the civil courts, S. 2155 § 401. Proceeding by adminis-
trative decree, NEw ZEnaiD Act No. 134 § 23; allowing restitution only at
the hands of the victim, BRITISH WHITm PAPER § 28. See Childres, supra note
1, at 465-67,
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that welfare laws spring from a different problem. They fulfill a
different function, deal with a discrete class of people, and in
every detail stand unrelated to the reform first advocated by the
late Miss Margery Fry.4 7
The California statute is an unfortunate one, and it seems high-
ly unlikely that the welfare department will be able to mold it
into a decent program.
IV. GENERAL PROBLEMS
A. IWTRODUCTION
Except for the California plan, the proposals and programs
suggest an administrative agency of three or five members48 The
Commission is given reasonable discretion and freedom from the
strict procedural rules thought to be necessary safeguards in
courts of law. It is to this framework that I will refer in discussing
several objections to compensation proposals.
B. COST
We now have evidence that the cost of compensation will not
be great. In its first eleven months (to July, 1965) the British
agency made grants totalling 232,234.80 dollars;49 in 18 months,
New Zealand has paid out 4,888 dollars.50 The California program,
for its first year, is restricted to expenditures of 100,000 dollars.51
These figures prove nothing, but are persuasive that we are talk-
ing about small sums of money. In an age when workmen's com-
pensation premiums in New York alone exceed 250,000,000 dol-
lars a year, 2 and when state budgets to protect minority groups
from discrimination exceed 1,500,000 dollars annually,58 the cost
of compensation for criminally inflicted personal injury, seen in
proper perspective, becomes small indeed.
For the moment, the question should be allowed to rest here.
47. Fry, Justice for Victims, The Observer (London), July 7, 1957. p. 8,
col. 2, reprinted in 8 J. PUB. L. 191 (1959).
48. Five members, BmrTisn WHITE PAPER § 9; three members, NEw ZEA-
LAia Act No. 134 § 4(2); JusTIcE, at 57 (requiring at least one woman); and
S. 2155 § 201(a).
49. Worsnep, Compensation. for Victims of Crime, 11 EDiToRIAL RFnsnrcH
IRpoRTS 685, 691 (1965).
50. Id. at 689.
51. CAL. STAT. ch. 1549 (1965).
52. Gellhorn & Lauer, Administration of the New York Workmen's Com-
pensatiwn Law, 87 N.Y.UJJ. Rnv. 564, 601, (1962).
53. N w Yonx REBoox 40 (1963-64).
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Factual demonstrations which show that some proposals in some
areas cost very little are more persuasive than arguments to the
contrary. The British experience would indicate that the cost of
a compensation program will not be prohibitive.
C. F D RAL-STATE RELATIONS
As with any proposed reform in this country, some critics have
raised the tired banner of antisocialism, meaning in this context
fear of the federal government. 5 This banner is irrelevant to com-
pensation for criminally inflicted personal injury, because the
proposal is primarily for the states. It is designed for the federal
government only with respect to the District of Columbia, the
federal territories, and the maritime jurisdiction.
D. BuREAUCRACY
Compensation will not greatly increase the bureaucracy of
any state. The three man commission should act primarily on
reports prepared by the office of the relevant prosecuting attor-
ney. I have set out elsewhere, as have others,5 5 procedures to mini-
mize the agency's work load. The proposed reform is too small,
and the level of expenditure too low, to provoke fears of bureau-
cratic monsters.
E. FPAuDULENT CLAIMS
We need not take the position that fraudulent claims must be
entirely eliminated before compensation can be justified. We can
establish the probability that fraud will be a marginal problem
only; more cannot be fairly asked. But the problem must receive
more attention than is provided by Senator Yarborough or the
State of California.
(1) The victim or someone in his behalf must report the in-
juring conduct to the police within a brief period, say four
weeks, if the injury is to be compensable.
(2) Upon being instructed by the police, the victim or his
dependents must file a medical report. The cost should be borne
by the agency, whether or not compensation is allowed.
54. Mueller, Should Society Pay Crime's Victims?, THE ROTARIAN, Sept.
1965, pp. 23, 24-25; Inbau, Compensation, for Victims of Criminal Violence, 8
J. Pun. L. 201 Passim (1959).
55. See BRITISH WHITE PAPER §8 9-18, 23-27; NEw ZEALAND Act No. 134
88 4-16; S. 2155, 88 201-203, 205-208; Childres, supra note 1, at 464-70.
[Vol. 50:2 71282
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(3) Filing a false report or colluding therein should be a crime.
(4) The agency should be empowered to recover awards
fraudulently obtained, plus a penal sum.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper leaves open many questions which I have dis-
cussed previously." Governor Rockefeller of New York has
appointed a three man committee to produce a draft statute to
provide compensation in that state.57 Hopefully this committee
will produce a scheme for compensation capable of serving as a
model for other states.
56. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 89
N.Y.U.L. REV. 444 (1964).
57. N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.

